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Lecture:  Innovation, Incentives, 
Competition, and Patent 
Law Reform: Should 
Congress Fix the Patent 
Office and Leave Litigation 
Management to the Courts?* 
 Welcome:  Dean Michael Treanor* 
 Introduction:  Hugh C. Hansen 
 Lecturer:  Chief Judge Paul Michel 
 
DEAN TREANOR: I’m Bill Treanor.  I’m the Dean of 
Fordham Law School.  It’s my pleasure and privilege to welcome 
you to tonight’s lecture by Chief Judge Michel of the Federal 
Circuit.  It’s a public lecture, sponsored by Cooper & Dunham and 
John White.  Cooper & Dunham is, as you know, the patent law 
firm which has been such a great sponsor of our IP program and is 
the sole sponsor of our Visiting Distinguished Fellowship 
Program, which has brought the Chief Judge to Fordham here this 
year. 
Professor Hugh Hansen, known to all of you, an iconic figure 
in the world of intellectual property, will have the privilege of 
 
A PDF version of this Transcript is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexx/book4.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
*  Chief Judge Michel’s lecture was given in November 2009 at Fordham University 
School of Law as part of the Fordham Intellectual Property Institute’s Visiting 
Distinguished Fellowship Program.  All footnotes are attributed to the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal. 
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introducing the Chief Judge in a moment.  I have the privilege of 
delivering a few preliminary remarks. 
First of all, I would just like to talk about the Fordham 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy Annual Conference, which is 
now in its eighteenth year and has literally put Fordham on the 
map in intellectual property.  Really, it’s a tribute to Professor 
Hansen.  He really envisioned the Fordham intellectual property 
program at a time when law schools really didn’t have intellectual 
property programs. 
We started with the conference, and now it has grown into the 
Fordham Intellectual Property Law Institute, which plays a leading 
role in the field of intellectual property law.  In addition to 
planning and conducting the IP conference and an annual 
roundtable seminar in London, the IP Law Institute has IP fellows.  
We have three this semester.  It will have a Microsoft Research 
and Teaching Fellow beginning this January, a two-year 
appointment for a junior academic or lawyer from abroad who will 
teach at Fordham and support their IP scholarship.  We have a 
Distinguished Visiting Judicial Fellow, which this year is the 
Honorable Paul Michel, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit. 
While the Judicial Fellow is here—and this week we have had 
the Chief Judge here; I have to say, what a great honor that has 
been for us—the Fellow does a luncheon address to the faculty, 
teaches a master class, delivers remarks, and has a question-and-
answer session with students at a student reception, has lunches or 
dinners with faculty and students, and delivers this public lecture, 
which again is made possible by the sponsorship of Cooper & 
Dunham and John White. 
Again, Professor Hansen will introduce the Chief Judge in a 
moment.  He is one of the giants in the field of patent law.  He has 
been on the bench of the Federal Circuit since 1988 and has been 
Chief Judge since 2004.  So he has been at the helm at, really, a 
critical period and a fascinating time.  He has done the most 
extraordinary job and is just a giant in the field.  I’m such a huge 
fan of his.  To have somebody of his stature at Fordham Law really 
brings such great honor to us, and it’s just such a treat for our 
C02_MICHEL_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  12:28 PM 
2010] SHOULD CONGRESS FIX THE PATENT OFFICE? 1137 
 
students and our faculty and our alumni and everybody who 
benefits from this great program. 
Chief Judge, I just want you to know how grateful we are.  
Without any further ado, I turn matters over to the iconic Professor 
Hugh Hansen. 
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you for your kind words.  Before I 
introduce the Chief Judge, let me just say something about William 
Treanor. 
Fordham has been lucky to have a series of outstanding deans, 
and certainly Bill has been one of our finest ever.  The first year 
for any law school dean is difficult.  If there had been such an 
award, he would have been voted “Rookie of the Year.”  He hit the 
ground running and has been fantastic on so many levels, and 
especially with regard to our intellectual property program.  All of 
us in the program thank Dean Treanor for his support. 
 Our IP program has many facets.  Joel Reidenberg has his 
Center on Law and Information Policy which focuses on IT and 
Privacy law, and also IP law.  We have one of the best and high-
ranking IP journals in the country, the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal.  We have a 
brand new IP Clinic, with Ron Lazebnik as its director.  We have 
an excellent core group of full-time IP professors, and also an 
outstanding group of adjunct professors who teach many of our 
courses.  And then we have our IP Institute.  I invite you to visit 
our website to see some of the things that we do, 
fordhamipinstitute.com.  One of the most rewarding is to host our 
Distinguished Visiting Judicial/Professorial Fellow each year. 
I’m happy tonight to introduce our honored guest and this 
year’s Distinguished Visiting Judicial Fellow.  It is great that 
someone with the responsibilities of Chief Judge Michel has 
agreed to spend most of the week here at the School.  And the 
highlight of that week is to deliver this lecture. 
Chief Judge Michel has an interesting background.  He started 
off at Williams College and the University of Virginia Law 
School, which is certainly a good start.  His first legal job was with 
Arlen Specter as a prosecutor in Philadelphia back in the day, 
investigating police and public corruption.   
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Then he became an assistant Watergate prosecutor.  I wonder 
how many people here tonight were alive at the time of Watergate.  
It was a time of tremendous political upheaval.  Paul had great 
assignments.  He investigated Nixon’s slush fund, Howard 
Hughes—I didn’t even know Howard Hughes was involved in 
Watergate—Bebe Rebozo, who was pretty well-known then, 
Nixon’s secretary, Rose Mary Woods, and the eighteen-minute gap 
in the tapes recorded in the Oval Office. 
Actually, Paul, a lecture on what you did back then would be 
pretty interesting. 
He then moved on to the assistant counsel for the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the Church Committee, investigating 
abuses of civil liberties by U.S. law enforcement agencies targeting 
American citizens, and I guess American citizens abroad.  Paul 
then went on to be deputy chief of the Justice Department’s new 
Public Integrity Section, which directed the “Koreagate” 
investigation. 
An interesting background, Paul, but it kind of looks like you 
couldn’t hold down a job for very long. 
Then he went on to Senator Arlen Specter’s staff as counsel 
and chief of staff in the Senate.  Up until this time, Paul became a 
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1988 when 
he had no IP experience at all.  It is interesting to contrast that with 
where he is today.  He has been on Managing Intellectual 
Property’s list of the fifty most important people in IP in the 
world1 every year since 2003.2   
Chief Judge Michel has received a gazillion awards, too many 
to mention.  He taught at a number of law schools and has given 
lectures at a slew of universities.  Over the course of his time in the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Paul has authored over 
800 opinions.  That’s a lot of opinions.  That averages close to 
forty a year, which, on a circuit level, is a tremendous amount.  Of 
 
 1 Meet the People Shaping the Future of IP, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.managingipjobs.com/Article/2249869/Meet-the-people-shaping-the-future-
of-IP.html. 
 2 Hon. Paul R. Michel, Chief Circuit Judge—Biography, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. 
CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
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course, many of these were very important decisions.  He has been 
a very influential judge. 
Paul has sat by designation as a judge on the Second, Third, 
and Ninth Circuit.  Of course, Paul would agree with me that of 
those the Second is the best. 
He has been involved in interesting judicial interplays with the 
Supreme Court.  The most recent aspect of this occurred with 
respect to the Bilski opinion,3 in which the Supreme Court just 
heard oral arguments a little while ago.4  Chief Judge Michel wrote 
the majority en banc Federal Circuit opinion in that case.  I’m sure 
if there are questions—and we are going to have quite a bit of a 
question-and-answer period—Paul would be willing to address 
some of the issues in the Bilski situation. 
In any case, without further ado, I would like to introduce 
Chief Judge Paul Michel. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Thank you, Hugh, for the nice 
welcome, and Dean Treanor, for your kind words. 
I can tell you exactly why I am here in a single word: Respect, 
respect for Fordham Law School, where I now make my fourth 
visit, for its students, its faculty, and its future orientation, and 
respect for Hugh Hansen.  Professor Hansen recruited me to be a 
part of his famous Easter Week international patent symposium 
some years ago, and I had such a great time, I couldn’t wait to be 
invited back.  Ultimately I was and made a second appearance on 
this very little stage here, I think it was eighteen months ago, and 
once again was impressed with the quality of the conference, 
including the interplay with the audience.  I hope we can match 
that here tonight. 
The Dean was too kind or too grandiose in saying that I was 
going to deliver a lecture.  What I propose to do is a little bit 
different.  I propose to make some remarks to try to stimulate a 
dialogue with all of you.  I’m going to try to manage the time so 
that we have at least a half an hour to deal with questions.  I’m 
 
 3 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 4 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (No. 08-964). 
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very interested in what’s on your mind, whether you are academics 
or practitioners or have some other role in the overall drama of 
intellectual property in the United States, and particularly the 
patent law. 
So here we go. 
Number one, my thesis is that the patent system is the most 
important single engine for economic progress now in the United 
States.  We no longer make a lot of the things we used to make and 
export that served as the foundation for the great and growing 
prosperity in this country.  What do we make?  We basically make 
innovations of various kinds, not all patented, but many patented or 
eligible to be patented.  As a result, patents are critical to the level 
of investment in research and development.5  Of course, not all 
research and development comes from the leverage that patents 
provide, but a very large portion clearly does. 
For example, startup companies that provide so much in the 
way of innovation, scientific progress, and job creation almost 
always depend on venture capital.6  After all, they don’t really 
 
 5 See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Market Value, R&D, and Patents, in 11 NATIONAL BUREAU 
OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 249, 250 (1984) (finding significant and positive effects of 
R&D and the number of patents applied for on the value of the firm); Igor Prodan, 
Influence of Research and Development Expenditures on Number of Patent Applications: 
Selected Case Studies, in OECD Countries and Central Europe, 1981–2001, in 5–4 
APPLIED ECONOMETRICS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 5, 19 (2005) (finding “a 
positive correlation between R&D and patent applications”); F.M. Scherer, Research and 
Development Expenditures and Patenting, 10 APLA Q.J. 60, 70 (1982) (“The probability 
that a business unit will receive any patents in a ten-month period is higher, the more 
R&D that unit does.  The number of patents received varies nearly linearly with the 
amount of company-financed R&D performed.”). See generally Robert M. Hunt, 
Economics and the Design of Patent Systems, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457 
(2007) (discussing the relationship between patents and R&D). 
 6 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control 
in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 968–69 (2006) (“Venture capitalists . . . play a 
significant role in the financing of high-risk, technology-based startup companies, 
investing billions of dollars annually in these businesses . . .  [and] provid[ing] valuable 
management and strategic advice to these startups, many of which are founded by 
entrepreneurs with little business experience.  As a result, venture capital is an important 
contributor to economic growth in the United States and elsewhere.”); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2003) (“The venture capital market and firms . . . are among the 
crown jewels of the American economy . . . [and] have been a major force in 
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have profits yet.  They often don’t even have a product in their 
early stages.  So they are dependent on venture capital, and, 
understandably, venture capitalists are not eager to invest money if 
there is no assurance they will get a return on the investment.  
That’s what the patent essentially provides. 
A great deal of innovation also comes from universities, from 
research institutes, from individual inventors, as well as the 
startups that I mentioned.  Then, of course, the rest comes from the 
large, well-known corporations in this powerful economy and 
country. 
The question is, if we are so dependent on the incentive 
provided by patents, are we maintaining, are we strengthening, are 
we modernizing our patent system?  If you compare us with some 
of our competitors, I think we could say very confidently that 
China is assiduously strengthening its patent system in every way, 
by leaps and bounds, every year.7  Some believe that here in the 
United States, instead of strengthening, much less just maintaining 
the patent system, we actually are in the process of weakening the 
patent system in various ways, particularly in the form of the 
pending legislation now being considered by the Senate, the so-
called patent reform bill, otherwise known as S. 515.8 
 
commercializing cutting-edge science . . . .  The venture capital market . . . provides a 
unique link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms . . . 
high-return activities.”). 
 7 See Hot Property: Can China’s IP System Cope with the Rise in Patent 
Applications?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON.COM (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.knowledgeat 
wharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&articleID=1969&languageid=1 
(“Applications for new patents in China have increased exponentially and will surpass 
Japan, the current leader in new patents, by 2012 . . . .  China, from humble beginnings, is 
experiencing the most rapid growth . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Joff Wild, 
Seeing the Forrest: Considering Worldwide Patent Trends, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 7, 2009, 
10:10 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/08/seeing-the-forrest-considering-
worldwide-patent-trends.html (“[T]he one major economy which currently seems to be 
bucking the trend is China. . . .  PCT applications with a Chinese origin are up 19% in 
2009. . . .  For the first time ever in China, invention patent grants made to local 
applicants now exceed those made to foreign entities.”).  
 8  Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); see Press Release, IP 
Advocate, IP Advocate Joins Small Business Coalition on Patent Legislation to Protect 
and Promote Rights of University Scientists in Federal Patent Debate (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.ipadvocate.org/press/pdfs/Coalition_NR.pdf [hereinafter IP Advocate Joins 
Small Business Coalition] (“The proposed reforms greatly weaken our U.S. patent 
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Why do some people say it would weaken the effectiveness of 
the patent system?  For one thing, it may very well increase costs 
and delays.9  Already justly the source of much complaint, they 
both are likely to be made worse by some provisions of the bill as 
it currently stands, particularly, for example, the provision dealing 
with damages.10 
Secondly, the bill would make it nearly impossible, in my 
practical judgment, to establish willful infringement, and therefore 
the potential for enhanced damages, which, as you know, can be 
multiplied, in appropriate cases, up to three times,11 much as in the 
case of antitrust law. 
Third, the bill would allow interlocutory appeals of bare claim 
construction rulings, even when they are not dispositive on the 
issue of liability.12  Where they are dispositive, almost always 
summary judgment is granted, and the parties have an appeal as of 
right from a grant of summary judgment.  So we already get very 
large numbers of interlocutory appeals, in the sense that there 
hasn’t yet been a trial; there has mainly been a claim construction, 
and that’s about all.  But the bill would add to the existing 
interlocutory appeals, which always are dispositive by definition, 
 
system, which has historically rewarded innovators for creating novel industries and 
businesses that generate large numbers of new jobs.”).  In early 2010, the Senate “revived 
interest in the patent reform act with a substitute bill entitled the ‘Patent Reform Act of 
2010.’” Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 8, 2010, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-overview.html.  
 9 IP Advocate Joins Small Business Coalition, supra note 8 (“[T]he provisions for 
expanded ‘Post Grant Opposition’ . . . will allow anyone to challenge any patent for any 
reason within the first 12 months of its issuance. . . .  [T]he resulting costs and delays will 
cripple innovation and thwart start-up investments in companies that rely on patents for 
their survival.”).  
 10 S. 515, § 4. 
 11 Id. § 4(e)(1) (“A court that has determined that an infringer has willfully infringed a 
patent or patents may increase damages up to 3 times the amount of the damages found or 
assessed under subsection (a) . . . .”). 
 12 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM 
IN THE 111TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 30–31 (2009), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19108.pdf (“Ordinarily, litigants 
may appeal only ‘final decisions’ from the district courts.  Although federal law currently 
allows for . . . [interlocutory appeal] at trial . . . [the] Federal Circuit has declined to 
accept such appeals for routine claim interpretation cases. . . .  S. 515 would expressly 
authorize such interlocutory appeals.”); see S. 515, § 8(b). 
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because of summary judgment, a lot of cases—who knows the 
number—where it’s not dispositive.  The practical impact of that 
would be more cost and more delay than the status quo has. 
Some people think that the damages and interlocutory appeals 
provision should either be greatly changed or stripped out of the 
bill altogether.13 
What else could be said about the bill as it translates into cost 
and delay?  It creates a new form of reexamination of patents, at 
the behest of third parties,14 and it provides for a year window for a 
post-grant review after the issuance of patent and gives the Patent 
Office a year from that filing to resolve the review.15  There is a 
big issue about whether the threshold for reexam is high enough.  
There may be some modifications under way right now.  But the 
current trigger, a substantial new question of patentability, is 
deemed met by the Patent Office in 95% of the applications.16  So 
it’s almost no standard at all.  Anybody who wants to get a reexam 
can get it, except for 5% of the time. 
I think both of these provisions would also add some delay, and 
add delay and trouble in the Patent Office that can least afford it of 
all the institutions that are part of the larger patent system. 
 
 13 See, e.g., Edward Reines & Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim 
Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 13 (“[A]s 
drafted, the interlocutory appeals provision is short-sighted.  It unwisely deprives the 
Federal Circuit of its role in the interlocutory appeal process [and] proposes a false 
solution to the wrong issue.”); The Patent Reform Act of 2009—Interlocutory Claim 
Construction Appeals Create a Whole New Patent Backlog, PROMOTE PROGRESS BLOG 
(Mar. 12, 2009), http://promotetheprogress.com/the-patent-reform-act-of-2009-
interlocutory-claim-construction-appeals-create-a-whole-new-patent-backlog/1121 
(“[The provision is] clearly a short-sighted, duct-tape solution that shows a lack of 
concern for the patent law as a whole.  The ‘problem’ of claim construction, and the 
patent law as a whole, would be better served by legislatively requiring a degree of 
deference to district court judges during normal appellate review of claim construction 
issues.”). 
 14 S. 515, § 5 (“Any third-party requester at any time may file a request for inter partes 
reexamination by the Office of a patent.”). 
 15 Id. (“[T]he final determination in a post-grant proceeding [should] issue not later 
than one year after the date on which the post-grant review proceeding is instituted.”). 
 16 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 
(2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/documents/ex_parte.pdf (indicating that 
reexamination has been granted for about 92% of requests since the start of ex parte 
reexamination in 1981). 
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I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that the Patent Office is 
virtually dysfunctional today.  The delay to get a final office action 
in a patent examination runs roughly between two and five years.17  
In some technologies, it’s more than that.  The delay at the board 
level on reviewing examiner rejections is over two years and 
growing.18  The average experience level of most of the 6000 
examiners at the PTO is three and a half years.19  Now, I don’t 
know about you, but most people in a new, difficult, challenging 
job take three or four years to really get to be any good at it and 
ready to tackle tough cases.  But that’s the average time in the 
Patent Office.  Of course, it’s understandable.  These young 
engineers and scientists and people from other similar backgrounds 
can double or triple their salary by walking out the door and going 
into private industry. 
Beyond the inexperience of the examiners, the supervision by 
more senior examiners is also very limited.  First of all, there aren’t 
very many of them, because they also have usually left—maybe 
not after three years, but, let’s say, after five or six.  In fact, the 
Patent Office can’t even house all of its examiners.  A large 
portion of them and board members, too, work at home.  How 
close can the supervision be for a young examiner if she or he is 
working at home? 
The real problem is that the Patent Office doesn’t have 
anywhere near the revenue or the resources it needs to do the job 
fast and well.  I think it’s kind of interesting that, for all the 
 
 17 See Matthew John Duane, Lending a Hand: The Need for Public Participation in 
Patent Examination and Beyond, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 57, 67 n.78 (2008) 
(“[D]elays between the filing of an application and its examination . . . can be as long as 
four or five years for certain disciplines.”); see also Troy L. Gwartney, Note, 
Harmonizing the Exclusionary Rights of Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1395, 1410 (2009) (“[A] typical examination takes three years to 
complete.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Peter Zura, Employing Successful Strategies for Patent Litigation, in 
ASPATORE, RECENT TRENDS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
ANALYZING SIGNIFICANT PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL 
LITIGATION STRATEGIES (2010). 
 19 See Patent Examiner Experience Levels, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 5, 2010, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/patent-examiner-experience-levels.html 
(indicating that the vast majority of patent examiners have fewer than three years of 
experience and very few have greater than ten years of experience). 
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different provisions that are in the patent reform bill, there’s not 
one dollar of extra money provided for the Patent Office, which 
seems to me to be the single greatest need of all. 
Some years ago, Congress mandated that the Patent Office be 
self-supporting—that is, that all of its revenue to operate would 
have to come from fees charged to applicants.20  Indeed, the fees 
were raised in the wake of that decision to try to provide more 
resources.21  The problem is that the fees are controlled by 
Congress,22 and not by the Patent Office, and they have proven to 
be hugely inadequate. 
Not only that, but for six years, Congress diverted part of the 
fee money and devoted it to pet pork projects designed to help 
members get reelected.23  So the Office didn’t even get all of the 
fee money, even when the total would have been inadequate 
anyway. 
In more recent years, Congress has desisted from that practice, 
which is an improvement.  Still, the main problem is that the 
resources are just inadequate.  In fact, for most of the last year and 
a half there has been a total hiring freeze at the Patent Office.  This 
 
 20 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 
(canceling the use of taxpayer support for Patent Office operations); see also Maud S. 
Beelman, U.S. Patent Office Bursting with Ideas, Creative Boom Overwhelms Staff, 
Resources, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 26, 1997, at A2 (“The patent office became self-
supporting in 1992 under legislation that required it to raise fees nearly 70 percent to 
replace taxpayer support of its budget.”). 
 21 See MARLA PAGE GROSSMAN, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, DIVERSION OF USPTO 
USER FEES: A TAX ON INNOVATION 2 (2009), http://www.ipi.org/IPI/IPIPublications.nsf/ 
PublicationLookupFullTextPDF/D1E21F10301948E2862575A90056D672/$File/PatentF
eeDiversion.pdf?OpenElement (noting that the intent behind the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 was to shift the source of USPTO revenue away from 
taxpayer dollars and towards user fees). 
 22 See Dan Goodin, Budget Sparks Bill to Protect PTO Funds, Diversions from Self-
Funded Agency to Hit All-Time High, S.F. RECORDER, Feb. 14, 1997, at 1 (“While patent 
application fees are intended to make the PTO self-funding, Congress retains control over 
how a portion of the money is spent.  Congress’ raids on the PTO budget have grown 
progressively larger over the years, with more than $142 million siphoned away since 
1992.”). 
 23 See, e.g., So Called Patent Reform Cheats U.S. Investors, INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 
2007, at A15 (“The unconscionable delay in processing patent applications resulted when 
Congress diverted the fees paid by inventors into pork and other pet projects.”). 
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is the same Patent Office where examiners are leaving in droves 
for the higher salaries I mentioned before.  So the workload is 
going up, but the workforce is going down and the experience level 
is going down.  They are suffering considerable attrition. 
In fact, some of the ways that they used to incentivize 
examiners to stay are now no longer available.  A great many of 
you may remember that in days of old the Patent Office would 
send you to law school and the government would pay for it.  
Meanwhile, you worked during the day as an examiner.  That 
program has been discontinued. 
Not only that, but we have had an upsurge in filings over the 
last decade that have led to a truly awful situation.  There are 
750,000 applications, the paper versions of which are sitting in a 
warehouse, unread by any human being, for months and months 
and months and months.  There are another 500,000 applications 
that are under examination, but of a very slow, halting, sporadic 
sort.  So you have upwards of 1.5 million applications that aren’t 
going anywhere fast, which I think is a scandal.  When you 
consider how fast the pace is in the business world and how fast 
certain technologies are surging forward, to have a system where it 
takes half a decade to get a patent issued and where the 
applications sit in a warehouse for years I think is nothing short of 
a disgrace. 
There are many other detailed things that could be said about 
the Patent Office, but I hope that in that quick sketch you can see 
the reason why many people, including me, feel that the Patent 
Office is in a crisis situation, it’s nearly dysfunctional, and it needs 
to be rescued.  The short answer is that the fees need to go up and 
Congress needs to infuse it with a huge amount of cash, probably 
on the order of about $1 billion a year, at least for a brief 
transitional period, until it can beat down that backlog, get more 
experienced examiners, improve its whole process.  Its computer 
systems are terrible, which, of course, is another huge handicap. 
Let me shift now to the courthouse.  If there are big problems 
in the Patent Office, what about in the courthouse, trial or 
appellate?  I’ll concentrate initially on the trial courts. 
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Everybody would probably agree that they are too slow and too 
expensive.  Typically it takes three to six years to get a final 
judgment in a district court.  It may take somewhere in the range of 
$5 million to $20 million, depending on the complexity of the 
case.24  If I’m right in my concern about interlocutory appeals, 
with appeals currently taking a year, we will have another couple 
years of delay because of the interlocutory appeal provision.  Let’s 
say you are in the district court for four years; you have an 
interlocutory appeal, five years; then you have some more work at 
the district court, six years; then you have a final appeal—maybe a 
final appeal; another appeal—to the Federal Circuit.  Now we’re at 
the seven-year mark—way too slow.  In today’s world, just way 
too slow. 
So the courthouse has problems, too. 
What the courts and the PTO both need to do is to improve 
their speed, their accuracy, and the infrastructure that helps them 
operate, such as the PTO computer system that I mentioned.  What 
happens if we don’t make these kinds of improvements or if we get 
counterproductive legislation?  The value of all the extant million 
patents will go down, so corporate wealth will suffer.  Research 
and development budgets will almost certainly go down.  
Therefore, innovation will go down.  Therefore, the infrastructure 
on which our future prosperity as a country heavily rests will be 
significantly threatened, in my judgment. 
Maybe it’s a little bit alarmist, but I think it’s fair to say there is 
a crisis in the Patent Office and there is a near-crisis in the 
courthouse. 
What’s being done?  I mentioned that the patent reform bill 
doesn’t provide an additional dollar to the Patent Office,25 even 
though dollars are what it needs more than anything else.  What’s 
the state of play in the courts?  The courts are short 100 judges.  
There are 100 vacancies today out of a judicial corps of about 900.  
 
24 See Catherine Rajwani, Controlling Costs in Patent Litigation, HARBOR L. GROUP, 
Nov. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.harborlaw.com/newsletters/november.pdf#zoom 
=100 (estimating a combined cost of about $10 million for both sides in an average patent 
case when more than $25 million is at risk).  
25 See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
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So we are 10% under-strength because of delays in the White 
House and the Senate.  Not only in the current administration, but 
in all recent administrations we have had this level of understaffing 
of the courts—about 100 judges. 
Secondly, we have so many long-delayed cases in the federal 
court system that year after year after year we have pleaded with 
Congress to create additional judgeships.  The current number is 
also about 100.  So there are 100 vacancies that aren’t being filled 
quickly and there are 100 judgeships being requested year after 
year, but not created by Congress. 
One measure of what a problem this is, is that today in 
America, there are 18,000—18,000—civil cases that have been 
sitting on the docket for more than three years without a trial.  I 
would say that’s a very unfortunate state of affairs, to put it very 
mildly. 
What about patent reform?  I don’t want you to think that I’m 
against reform.  I’m for improvement in the Patent Office, in the 
courthouse, and in the substantive law as well.  I think that there 
are many things in the current Senate Bill 515 that probably are 
very productive and appropriate.  It’s also my view that there are 
some things that are very counterproductive and dangerous.  In my 
view, the bill isn’t ready for what you might call primetime.  Yet it 
has been cleared by the Senate Judiciary Committee and it’s 
hovering around the floor awaiting final Senate action.  What 
about the House?  The House, which acted first last time, decided 
to defer to the Senate this time.  The scuttlebutt is that the House 
will accept whatever the Senate passes—just pass the same bill.  
So all the action seems to be in the Senate. 
What’s the problem with the bill in the Senate?  Part of the 
problem is the origin of it.  In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission 
(the “FTC”) issued a big report.26  Many of you are familiar with 
it, at least in general terms.  The next year, the National Academy 
of Sciences (the “NAS”) issued a similar report, both calling for 
rather fundamental change—you might even call it radical 
 
26 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
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reform.27  A year later, 2005, the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association (the “AIPLA”) issued an extended scholarly 
commentary on the two earlier reports by the aforesaid agencies.28  
Unfortunately, Congress paid no attention at all to the AIPLA 
report but, in its committee report, quotes extensively from the 
FTC and NAS reports.29 
The driving force behind the more controversial provisions in 
the Senate bill is fifteen significant companies in this country.30  
Probably they are clients of your firms, so I may be treading on 
dangerous ground here.  To a significant extent, the push in 
Congress for reform of the patent law has come from those fifteen 
firms, about ten in California and about five on Wall Street.31  The 
California firms include Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, Sun, 
Micron, and a few others, and the Wall Street firms include 
Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citibank, and a couple others.32 
What’s wrong with that?  Nothing is wrong with that.  But 
consider the context.  In this country today, there are 30,000 
companies—30,000—that employ at least 100 people.  If we go 
below 100 employees, obviously the number goes way up.  I don’t 
even know the number.  But let’s just stick with the 30,000 
companies that have at least that many employees. 
 
27 COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON. ET AL., A 
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. 
Myers eds., 2004) 
28 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE ANTITRUST 
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2005), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Issues_and_Advocacy/Comments2/DOJ/A
ntitrustModernizationResponse.pdf.  
29 See S. REP. NO. 111-18 (2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/ 
reports/111reports.cfm (follow “The Patent Reform Act of 2009” hyperlink). 
30 See Narri Subrati, Inventors’ Group Supporters Call Intel Founder Andy Grove’s 
Comments About Patents “Absurd and Irresponsible,” MARKETWIRE (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Inventors-Group-Supporters-Call-Intel-
Founder-Andy-Groves-Comments-About-Patents-Absurd-991871.htm.  
31 Several trade organizations representing companies across multiple industries as 
well as independent corporations have lobbied for patent reform, specifically, passage of 
the Patent Reform Act.  One notable example is the Coalition for Patent Fairness (the 
“Coalition”) (Intel, Cisco Systems, Sun Microsystems, and Citigroup, among others, are 
members). See Patent Reform Supporters, COALITION FOR PAT. FAIRNESS, 
http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/who/supporters (last visited May 13, 2010).   
32 See id. 
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The question is, what about all the other companies?  Have 
they been heard from equally with the fifteen companies that were 
so concerned to have some very major changes?  The answer is no, 
because of the way our political process works.  The fifteen firms 
that wanted radical change have hired big-time lobbyists, the 
people you read about all the time.33  They have made massive 
campaign contributions.34  They have conducted endless 
negotiations, mostly behind closed doors—not always, but 
mostly.35  They have had multiple “fly-ins.”  That’s a Washington 
expression.  A “fly-in” is when the CEO of your company comes 
in and buttonholes twenty senators and bends their ears for the 
benefit of the company—all of which is, of course, proper.  It’s 
probably constitutionally protected as a form of petitioning the 
government for redress of grievances.  It’s entirely proper for them 
to do it.  But it introduces distortion, if fifteen companies are 
hyperactive and the other 29,000 are mostly silent.  And it looks to 
me like that is more or less what has happened until lately. 
Some other distortions have come about.  Again, I want to be 
careful not to be misunderstood.  Quite a number of economists 
have chimed in with their views about the patent system and what 
needs to be changed.36  For example, Professors Lerner and Jaffe 
came out with a very dramatic book about how broken the patent 
 
33 In 2009, the Coalition reported spending $2.5 million on patent reform lobbying 
efforts, hiring such high profile firms as Patton Boggs LLP and Mayer Brown LLP.  
Lobbying—Coalition for Patent Fairness, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets. 
org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Coalition+for+Patent+Fairness&year=2009 (last visited 
May 13, 2010); see also Andrew Noyes, Lobbying Battle over Patent Overhaul Already 
Under Way, CONGRESSDAILY (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress 
daily/cdp_20081201_9297.php.   
34 See Suzanne Struglinski, Hatch, Cannon Push Patent Bill, DESERET NEWS, July 4, 
2007, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/680196208/Hatch-Cannon-push-patent-
bill.html (noting that Intel, among other large advocates for patent reform, has made 
contributions to the political campaigns of Sen. Orrin Hatch and Rep. Chris Cannon who 
were part of the congressional committee working on the 2007 version of the bill). 
35 See Noyes, supra note 33. 
36 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Open Source and Proprietary Models 
of Innovation: Beyond Ideology: PART IV: Collaborative Innovation, the Economics of 
Innovation, and Constructed Commons: Market Structure and Property Rights in Open 
Source Industries, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 336 (2009). 
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system is a couple years ago.37  Just yesterday in The New York 
Times, fund manager and Harvard Business School Adjunct 
Professor named Robert C. Pozen had an op-ed piece very critical 
of the patent system, suggesting some changes.38 
What I don’t want to be misunderstood about is, I’m not saying 
only lawyers should be allowed to talk about the patent system.  I 
think it’s very good to have economists as part of the debate.  But 
they shouldn’t dominate the debate, and people should be careful 
to see whether they understand the system well enough. 
For example, in the Lerner and Jaffe book, they complain that a 
Federal Circuit decision had double-compensated the successful 
patent owner by giving double damages.39  That is, they said that 
the patent owner in this case, which is called State Industries v. 
Mor-Flo Industries,40 got reasonable royalty and lost profits.41  As 
all of you know, those are alternatives, not things you get both of.  
But what the professors didn’t understand is that those two 
different forms of damages were for two different products and 
two different timeframes, and therefore it wasn’t double 
compensation at all.  It was single compensation.  They just didn’t 
understand how the system works.  So they reached a completely 
false conclusion. 
Similarly, Pozen just yesterday talked about how patents are 
awarded even if the invention isn’t what he called “really a 
breakthrough.”42  Of course, patent law doesn’t require that, to get 
a patent, you have a breakthrough invention.  It just requires that 
the invention be new and nonobvious and have a certain utility.43  
That has been the law for a century and a half.44  But Pozen, 
 
37 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2004). 
38 Robert C. Pozen, Inventing a Better Patent System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, at 
A33. 
39 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 37, at 114–15. 
40 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
41 Id. at 1576. 
42 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006) (“[P]atent validity [is] dependent upon three 
conditions: novelty, utility and nonobviousness.”). 
43 Id.  
44 Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the 
Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307, 308 (2005). 
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understandably perhaps, isn’t so aware of that.  So what he writes 
suffers a little bit, I think, from the lack of full context, which has 
also infected the work of some of the other outsiders, I’ll call 
them—meaning not patent lawyers, like most of you are—who 
have commented. 
What about the patent lawyers?  What about the other 29,985 
corporations?  Shouldn’t they be heard from?  What about the 
academics who have made a lifetime of scholarly study of the 
patent system and its effects?  Have they been heard from 
adequately? 
If you look at the witness list in the hearings that have gone on 
intermittently since 2005 in the House and the Senate, almost all of 
the witnesses were corporate officials, usually chief patent counsel 
or some similar official.45  No judges, hardly any professors, 
hardly any litigators.  They are the very people you would have 
expected, or I would have expected, to be front and center in the 
hearings, because they know the most.  They do this every day.  It 
doesn’t mean they have a monopoly of wisdom, but they would 
certainly be entitled to be heard from.  But mostly they weren’t. 
If you read the Senate report sending this bill to the floor, it 
skips over every single controversy and just cites the witnesses 
who support the provisions that the senators chose to leave in the 
bill,46 with no explanation of why the contrary statistics or analysis 
or testimony was ignored.  So the report isn’t nearly as impressive 
when you consider the underlying testimony as it is when you just 
read it.  It’s very erudite, it’s very thorough, it’s very detailed, it 
has a million footnotes, and so on. 
Meanwhile—meaning since the first patent bill was introduced 
in the House in 200547—the Supreme Court has issued several 
landmark patent cases,48 and so has the Federal Circuit.49  So a 
great many of the problems that the patent bill was intended to 
 
45 See, e.g., ABA Material on Proposed Patent Reform Legislation, 110th Cong. § 2 
(2008).   
46 See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON THE 
PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007 (2007).  
47 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
48 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
49 See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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address have been solved, in the meantime, and are no longer 
much in need of a solution, if at all: 
•  Of course, in the eBay50 case, the Supreme 
Court ended automatic injunctions, permanent 
injunctions51—if there ever was really such a 
thing.  I don’t think there was, but that’s what 
they were told. 
•  KSR52 raised the bar for nonobviousness to get a 
patent from the Patent Office or sustain it in 
court.53 
•  At the Federal Circuit, in Seagate,54 we 
addressed the willfulness problem and some 
deficiencies and criticisms of it55 and, I think, 
pretty well solved that. 
•  With a great hue and cry about excessive 
reasonable royalty damages, in recent cases in 
our court, including the Lucent56 case, we 
addressed that; I think we pretty well solved it. 
•  A lot of criticism of Eastern Texas and all the 
patent suits tending to go down there.  In three 
recent decisions,57 we addressed and, I think, 
largely resolved that problem.  We have four 
more mandamus petitions now, which are very 
likely to put further restraints on who can file in 
 
50 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
51 Id. at 393 (holding that for disputes arising under the Patent Act, the plaintiff must 
satisfy the generally applicable four-factor test for permanent injunctive relief). 
52 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
53 Id. at 403.  The patent was invalid because “a pedal designer of ordinary skill 
starting with Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on a fixed pivot point.” 
Id. at 424–25. 
54 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
55 See id. at 1370–72. 
56 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–36 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
57 In re Genentech Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Volkswagen of Am., 
Inc., 566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
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Texas.58  So I think that problem could be said 
to be well on the way to solution as well. 
There are other problems with the legislation.  Even if it’s very 
well balanced in terms of hearing from all industries, all 
technologies, all types and sizes of companies, one problem with 
legislation is that it’s like a snapshot.  Congress acts and it’s not 
likely to act again for another generation or two.  The last time we 
had a major patent statute was 1952.59  This was more than half a 
century ago.  If they pass S. 515, it’s likely to be another half-
century before they have a comprehensive revisiting of these 
issues.  So if they get anything wrong, it’s likely to be permanent, 
and if it’s costly, it’s likely to roll up the costs year after year after 
year. 
What about litigation?  What about courts?  In one way, they 
have an advantage, and in other ways, they don’t.  We can’t do the 
kind of massive analysis that Congress can do.  We don’t have the 
Congressional Research Service and the Budget Office and so on 
working for us.  But we can evolve things in a gradual way so that 
there is more predictability, and we can avoid the problem of 
permanent mistakes.  If we make a mistake, we can fix it, because 
the next case comes along, and they come in a steady stream.  But 
Congress, as a realistic matter—theoretically they could do it, but 
realistically they aren’t going to do it.  So there are certain 
advantages to letting the remaining fixes that may be needed for 
the problems that haven’t been fully solved be done mainly by the 
court, and not by Congress. 
What could Congress do constructively?  What it could do is 
fix the Patent Office, not only by giving it some money, but also, 
for example, by authorizing it to have workforce located other than 
in Washington, D.C.  Every other federal agency I can think of, of 
any size or note, has offices in multiple cities all around the United 
States.  In the Patent Office, every single examiner is in 
Washington, D.C.; every single supervisor is in Washington, D.C. 
 
58 In re VTech Commc’ns, Inc., No. 909, 2010 WL 46332 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2010); In 
re Wi-LAN Inc., 358 F. App’x 158 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Nintendo, 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
59 See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
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How about all the unemployed engineers in Detroit?  It might 
be a good idea to reemploy them, make them patent examiners, 
and open an office in Detroit, or other cities around the country.  
But it takes congressional permission. 
Fee-setting authority: Right now Congress sets the fees.60  The 
Patent Office can’t do it.  So when the need for more money goes 
up, the Patent Office is stuck.  They are helpless, unless Congress 
will cooperate, which it rarely gets around to doing.  True enough, 
it’s very busy with lots of other major and mind-numbing 
problems—health care, climate change, and all the rest.  But 
because of that, I think Congress needs to give fee-setting authority 
to the Patent Office. 
Congress should also permanently ban itself from diverting 
patent fee money the way it did for the six or seven years that I 
mentioned earlier. 
The other thing that Congress could do is not add to the 
burdens of the already-dysfunctional Patent Office.  Several 
provisions of this bill are going to give large chunks of new duties, 
difficult duties, to this beleaguered Patent Office.61  It seems like a 
very odd thing.  The workforce is going down, the backlog is going 
up, they can’t do their job well or rapidly, so we are going to give 
them even more work, and new and different work that they have 
never tried before and have no background or experience in.  It 
doesn’t sound to me like a very good recipe for improvement. 
There are many other issues, including whether to give the 
Patent Office substantive rulemaking authority.62  I think if that 
were done—and it’s being requested63—the result would be that 
the Patent Office would issue regulations which would basically 
erase the half-century of case law of the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals that preceded the Federal Circuit, and of the 
Federal Circuit these last twenty-seven years.  The result of that 
 
60 See 35 U.S.C. § 41. 
61 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 9 (2009).  The Patent and 
Trademark Office will have the power to set fees. Id. 
62 See, e.g., Letter from Gary Locke, Commerce Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to 
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Oct. 5, 2009), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/documents/111Documents.cfm. 
63 See, e.g., id. 
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would be more uncertainty, which means more delay and more 
costs and more problems for not just patent lawyers, but their 
clients, who are the people making the economy hum. 
I’m not trying to suggest that the courts are perfect or doing 
everything right.  I’m actually quite critical of a lot of things going 
on in the courts.  But once again, a lot of the numbers get to be 
quite distorted, and the truth never seems to catch up with the 
dramatic allegation that is thrown out by self-interested people.  
For example, it’s said that half the time the Federal Circuit reverses 
the claim construction of the district judge.64  Not true.  Not even 
close to true.  It’s not 50%, it’s not 40%, it’s not even 30%.  The 
total reversal rate in our court on all issues in patent infringement 
cases is 33%,65 and they are not all claim construction issues.  So 
the actual reversal rate is somewhere between 25 and 30%. 
It may still be too high.  I think it may be slightly too high.  But 
it’s not at the level that you keep hearing about because of the 
distortions that get thrown into the debate. 
We could improve that by granting a greater level of deference 
than we have so far on claim construction to the district courts.66  
I’m a proponent of that. Six other colleagues have indicated in 
public opinions67—for example, in the Amgen68 case—that they 
think we should revisit our precedent, Cybor,69 that said no 
deference; it’s all pure law de novo, from start to finish.70 
 
64 Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to 
Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191–93 (1999); see Kevin E. 
Noonan, Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit: A District Court Judge’s View, PAT. 
DOCS (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.patentdocs.org/2008/12/claim-construction-at-the-
federal-circuit-a-district-court-judges-view-1.html?cid=141278776. 
65 See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Statistics, U.S. CT. 
APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/statistics.html (last visited Apr. 12, 
2010) [hereinafter Federal Circuit Statistics].  Fifteen percent of all patent infringement 
cases were reversed or vacated in full in fiscal year 2009, while 25% of all patent 
infringement cases were affirmed in part. Id. 
66 Michel, supra note 64, at 1191–93. 
67 See, e.g., Sys. Mgmt. Arts, Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 382, 399 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
68 Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
69 Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
70 See id. at 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding a de novo standard of review).  
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We are addressing some other things.  We have addressed 
some recently, like cleaning up the product-by-process 
confusion,71 cleaning up the proper role of dictionaries in claim 
construction.72  On December 7, we will have an en banc oral 
argument dealing with the written-description requirement that will 
straighten some things out.73  So we are on the march, but there are 
still problems, not only of speed, but doctrinal problems.  Many of 
them are being addressed.  Many have already been addressed by 
us or by the Supreme Court, as I mentioned before. 
We don’t really have time to get into too much of a discussion 
about the Supreme Court.  But the Supreme Court has a great 
challenge when it tries to intervene in complex areas of patent law 
doctrine, whether it’s injunctions in eBay74 or obviousness in 
KSR75 or other cases—MedImmune76 and some of the others.  Why 
is that?  I have been on the court twenty-two years, nearly, and in 
my tenure, I have sat on and ruled on 1600 patent cases.  There is 
no justice on the Supreme Court today who has ruled on more than 
about eight patent cases in his whole life.  So the comparative 
advantage is revealed by the numbers. 
I’m not saying the Supreme Court should stay its hand.  Every 
court needs a reviewing court.  I’m in a hierarchical system, where 
I’m sworn to uphold the acts of Congress, the commands of the 
Constitution, and the precedents of the Supreme Court, and I do 
my level best every day to do exactly that.  But that doesn’t mean 
that the Supreme Court has an easy time getting it right in patent 
law, when it has so few cases and so little experience and when it 
often doesn’t get the full picture and doesn’t really understand the 
case law. 
 
71 See, e.g., Gregory S. Maskel, Product-by-Process Patent Claim Construction: 
Resolving the Federal Circuit’s Conflicting Precedent, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 115 (2006).  
72 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Ehab M. 
Samuel, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Inc.: A Baffling Claim Construction Methodology, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 519, 521–22 (2006) (relying on dictionaries 
alone encourages superficial claim construction with inadequate technical understanding 
of the invention).  
73 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
74 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
75 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
76 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
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For example, in the KSR case, it was said that the Federal 
Circuit had a rigid rule and that it used the so-called teaching-
motivation-suggestion test as the sole test,77 neither of which was 
true.  The Supreme Court was, in my opinion, substantially misled 
by interested parties.  Its opinion reflected the input that it received 
and, in my opinion, was not as helpful as it could have been. 
In fact, there is a certain respect in which the KSR decision is 
almost silly.  We had a test that used the phrase “motivation to 
combine.”78  The unanimous opinion for the Supreme Court, 
written by Justice Kennedy, said that what you look for is a 
“reason to combine.”79  What’s the difference?  “Motivation” to 
combine, “reason” to combine.  They are different words that 
mean, obviously, the same thing. 
So they have a hard time with that.  We have a hard enough 
time ourselves, but we have a lot more experience with it. 
What about Bilski?  The Supreme Court has heard the 
argument.80  The decision will probably come out in a few months.  
I’m not in the business of making predictions, but it’s too hard to 
resist making a stab at it.  I’m going to suggest that they will affirm 
the result; they will say that the application claims were not 
patentable—exactly what we said—but they’ll say that our 
reasoning wasn’t good enough.  They will probably say, as they 
did in KSR,81 that we were too rigid.  We’ll get dinged for being 
rigid again.82 
The funny thing is, if you read our opinion closely, it wasn’t 
rigid.  First of all, it was utterly plagiarized right out of Supreme 
 
77 KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (“There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea 
underlying the [teaching-suggestion-motivation] test and the Graham analysis.  But when 
a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness 
inquiry, as the [Federal Circuit] Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”).  
78 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (criticizing 
the lower court for failing to provide a sufficient motivation to combine), rev’d, 550 U.S. 
398 (2007).  
79 KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. 
80 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
81 KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. 
82  The Supreme Court later affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment but ultimately 
disapproved of the “machine-or-transformation test” as the sole test for determining the 
patentability of a process. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).   
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Court cases themselves, not out of our own cases.83  Secondly, we 
didn’t say it was the test for all time; we said it’s the test for now, 
and we openly said its application to areas like software, medical 
diagnostics, and business methods was not very clear.84  We said 
there might have to be new and different tests created for new and 
different technologies in the future.85 
Hopefully, the full picture will be before the Supreme Court in 
Bilski more than it was, apparently, in the case of KSR, before they 
actually rule. 
Now I want to get back briefly to the Senate and then come to a 
conclusion. 
The Supreme Court’s ability, whatever it is, depends heavily 
on selecting the right case for its review, because its reviews are so 
seldom.  My own view is that KSR was not a well-chosen case.  It 
wasn’t a case where we said that an obvious-seeming invention 
was nonobvious.  All we said was there were no findings by the 
trial judge, so we couldn’t review it.86  We didn’t uphold the 
patent.87  We sent it back to the trial judge to make the missing 
findings.88  Why is that a cert-worthy case?  It wasn’t even a 
precedential opinion.  It was a very short, vanilla kind of opinion. 
So maybe they took the wrong case.  Maybe Bilski is another 
instance of taking what may not be the right case. 
So that’s part of the challenge.  And part of the challenge also 
is that the Supreme Court tends to look almost exclusively to its 
own precedent, and a lot of its own precedent is from long before 
the 1952 Act.  In fact, a large portion of it is from the 1800s.89  Yet 
they tend, sort of reflexively, to go back and quote their old cases 
and ignore all the things that have happened since.  They also tend 
 
83 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
84 Id. at 962 (questioning “[w]hich, if any, of these processes qualify as a 
transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing constituting patent-
eligible subject matter?”). 
85 See id. 
86 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881) (barring patent in case of public 
use); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850) (introducing concept of 
nonobviousness).  
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to ignore the full body of Federal Circuit cases.  For example, they 
looked at our KSR opinion quite incisively and quite critically, but 
KSR wasn’t the opinion on obviousness.  We had about a dozen 
cases dealing with obviousness.90  If they had read all of those 
cases as a body of law, they would have seen that the doctrine that 
we created was nowhere near what they were being told by some 
of the advocates that it was. 
So where are we?  We’re in a situation where the courts are 
doing about as well as they can, except at the margins, where the 
PTO needs to be rescued and where Congress needs to be more 
careful.  Listen to some of the things Congress has been told. 
“There’s an absolute explosion of patent infringement 
litigation, a huge spike in patent litigation.”91  But if you look at 
the metrics, it’s hard to see how that’s true.  For the last twenty 
years, the level of filings in patent infringement cases has been 
exactly 1% of the number of patents in force—unchanged over 
twenty years.92  So how is that a litigation explosion? 
It was told to Congress, “We have to have many radical 
changes, including interlocutory appeals, because we can’t stand to 
have so many expensive retrials of patent cases.” 
Most patent cases never get tried once, much less twice.  So 
this was, if not fiction, at least a highly distorted assertion made to 
Congress.  They had difficulty, it seems, in sorting out the 
truthfulness of some of these things. 
It was also said that there was a huge number of frivolous 
lawsuits.93  But if you look at the statistics of how many lawsuits 
where there were Rule 11 violations, findings of frivolity, or 
shifting of attorneys’ fees—almost none.  Wouldn’t you expect 
 
90 See, e.g., Duro Last v. Custom Seal, 321 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2003); U.S. Surgical 
v. Ethicon, 103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Connell v. Sears, 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 
1983).  
91 See Data from Stanford Shows 2007 Spike in Patent Defendants, PRIOR ART (Dec. 
11, 2008), http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2008/12/stanford-iplc-release. 
html. 
92 See Federal Circuit Statistics, supra note 65. 
93 See Lee Petherbridge, Response, On Addressing Patent Quality, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
13, 17 (2009) (discussing how to discourage frivolous lawsuits).   
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that if there were huge numbers of plainly frivolous lawsuits, you 
would see the courts fighting back in that way? 
Congress was told also that the damages in recent years had 
become grossly excessive, particularly reasonable royalty damages 
in component cases94—you know, the one chip covered by a 
patent, and the argument was made that the price of the total 
computer was being used as the metric, and the result was grossly 
inflated damage awards.  If you look at the PriceWaterhouse 
studies going back over the same twenty-year period, the median 
patent infringement award hasn’t changed more than a few 
hundred thousand dollars.95  The median is about $3 million.96  
That hasn’t changed over all these years. 
So again it looks like a lot of things have been urged on 
Congress that may not be completely accurate, or at least not in 
context. 
Is it too late to try to help Congress have a better sense of the 
context?  I don’t think so.  The latest intelligence that comes my 
way is that the Senate leaders have basically resolved that they 
can’t put this bill on the floor unless both parties agree and the 
controversial provisions are somehow compromised satisfactorily 
to all companies and industries.  At the moment, there is furious 
behind-the-scenes negotiation going on.97  There may, in fact, end 
up being more hearings.  There certainly is a chance for input.  It’s 
my thesis that Congress is in desperate need of additional input 
from knowledgeable lawyers like the men and women in this room 
and knowledgeable academics like Professor Hansen. 
So it seems fitting that we meet in a law school auditorium, 
because I’m going to try to give you an assignment.  I’m going to 
 
94 See generally Symposium, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Reform, Patent 
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (analyzing problems that arise 
in calculating reasonable royalty damages in cases where a patent covers one component 
of a complex product). 
95 PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2009 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 1, 5 (2009), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2009-patent-litigation-
study.pdf. 
96 Id. at 6.   
97 See generally Gene Quinn, Patent Reform Reportedly Top Priority in Congress, IP 
WATCHDOG (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/02/09/patent-reform-
reportedly-top-priority-in-congress/id=1974. 
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urge you to engage in an effort to try to help Congress better 
understand how the patent system in this country actually operates, 
so that when it makes these fateful decisions, it can do so in a fully 
informed way and come out with a product that will be 
constructive for the future health, not just of the patent system, but 
of the country. 
Thank you for your attention.  I look forward to your questions. 
PROF. HANSEN: That certainly was a lot of interesting food 
for thought—somewhat depressing thought, but still food for 
thought. 
Why don’t you write a letter to Congress, Paul? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: I did write a letter.  I pointed out to 
Congress that the damages provision then in the legislative 
language would require a trial of a difficulty and length apparently 
unprecedented in civil litigation, which would greatly add to the 
cost and delay98—the very two things that everybody, rightly, was 
complaining about were already intolerably high.  Some changes 
were made, but not as a result of my letter, but as a result of other 
industries weighing in.  I actually never got any response or 
acknowledgement to my letter, either from the House or the 
Senate, either in 2007 or in 2008.  So they apparently weren’t 
interested. 
No one from our court was called as a witness.  No district 
judge was called a witness.  No patent litigator that I can name was 
called as a witness.  Lots of self-interested company people were 
the witnesses. 
PROF. HANSEN: That is different from the situation in the 
U.K. where judges have significant input in legal legislation.  
Why don’t we open it up to thoughts, comments, and 
questions. 
QUESTION: Thank you, Your Honor.  My name is Demetrius 
Moshkoleis (phonetic).  I’m a Fordham alum. 
 
98 Letter from Hon. Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters (June 7, 2007), available at  
http://www.patentbaristas.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/michel-letter-6-7-
071.pdf.   
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I have many questions, but I will only restrict it to one now and 
let other people ask, too.  You touched on many different issues, 
but I didn’t hear anything about the suggested need for a transition 
to the first-to-file system99 instead of the first-to-invent.100  I think 
the U.S. is the only country right now that has the first-to-invent 
system,101 with its pros and cons.  I would like your opinion about 
that, weighing the advantages and disadvantages. 
Thank you. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Professor Hansen mentioned 
judges, myself particularly, writing a letter.  But I should 
acknowledge—some of you may not know this—that judges are 
restricted in what they can say to Congress.  On matters of pure 
policy, that’s thought to be exclusively in the province of 
Congress, and we are the implementers of their decisions, not the 
influencers of their decisions. 
Where we are allowed to comment, and really required to 
comment, is on what the impact will be on the court.  That’s why, 
on the interlocutory appeal and damages issues, I felt I was entirely 
within my proper sphere to be pointing out downstream 
consequence to Congress. 
But I didn’t comment, and I wouldn’t, on something like 
whether first-to-file versus first-to-invent should be instituted in 
our law.  It’s outside my proper sphere, number one.  And number 
two, frankly, I don’t know enough to have a well-informed opinion 
about whether, all things considered, on balance, we ought to make 
that shift, and ought to make it now.  My hunch is yes, but I 
frankly don’t know enough, so I really don’t have a position on 
that issue. 
PROF. HANSEN: How does our patent system compare to the 
U.K.—innovation policy, practical issues such as the number of 
 
99 See Jonathan W. Parthum & Philippe J.C. Signore, Patent Reform: The Debate 
Continues into 2010, 997 PLI/Pat 357, 374 (2010) (discussing the proposed initiative of 
shifting from a “first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system in which the first 
inventor to file his invention at the USPTO is awarded potential patent rights). 
100 See id. (“In a first-to-invent system, when two or more independent inventors are 
seeking patent protection on the same invention, the patent will be given to whoever was 
the first inventor between the two.”). 
101 Id. 
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examiners, litigation expenses, frivolous lawsuits, etc.?  How do 
we measure up? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Badly.  Discovery is much faster 
and cheaper and less disruptive.102  Trials are faster.  The quality is 
very high.  Of course, they don’t have juries in patent cases,103 an 
added complication that we have here.  They have a very good 
appellate court, in my opinion.  They have strong remedies.104  
They have strong deterrents against frivolous lawsuits.  They 
readily shift fees onto the loser if the lawsuit is very weak.105  That 
keeps frivolous lawsuits or near-frivolous lawsuits at bay. 
So I think, on almost every point you could use as a 
comparison, the English High Court does much better than we do 
now. 
PROF. HANSEN: What about the quality of patents being 
granted under the EPO or the U.K. Patent Office? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: I don’t know too much about the 
quality of patents issued in England or elsewhere in the European 
Union, so I probably shouldn’t say too much about that.  I’m told 
that the level of experience in, for example, the German Patent 
Office and the European Patent Office is vastly higher than the 
level of experience now available in the U.S. Patent Office.  I 
would infer from that that they are probably doing a better job in 
terms of quality, speed.  I just don’t know. 
QUESTION: My name is Chuck Miller.  I’m a patent 
practitioner. 
 
102 See Patent Litigation in the United Kingdom, LADAS & PARRY LLP, 
http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ForeignPatentLitigation/UK_Patent_Litigation.html 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
103 See id. 
104 See id.  The 1977 Patents Act specifically included remedies for contributory 
infringement for the first time. Id. 
105 See, e.g., Virginia G. Mauer, Robert E. Thomas & Pamela A. DeBooth, Attorney 
Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 272, 308–15 (1999).  “Section 51(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 gives most 
English courts discretion to allocate the costs of proceedings, and 51(3) gives the court 
the ‘full power to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid.’” Id. at 311 
n.133. 
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Could you comment on your view as to the effectiveness of 
mediation that is being done in some cases in the Federal Circuit?  
My concern is this: when parties mediate at your level, if it results 
in a settlement agreement, which may be confidential—I’m not 
sure—it prevents the formation of jurisprudence that the Federal 
Circuit should be creating for reference in future cases. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Those are very thoughtful 
questions.  We get about 400 patent infringement appeals a year.  
We also get a stream of infringement cases, as you know, from the 
International Trade Commission, and we get the Patent Office 
rejections that are appealed from the examiner to the board to us. 
But focusing just on the infringement cases, we get about 400 a 
year.  About 100 go away on their own, so we adjudicate about 
300.  We settle thirty to forty per year.  So we’re still grinding out 
lots and lots of opinions in all the other cases.  The settlements 
have helped us stay far more current than we otherwise would be 
able to.  I calculate that the mandatory mediation program that we 
instituted a few years ago gives us the equivalent of a judge and a 
half more, the power of an additional judge and a half.  So we’re 
that much more careful and expeditious than we would otherwise 
be, and there is still plenty of case law grinding out, several 
hundred a year. 
QUESTION: Good evening, Chief Judge Michel.  I’m Jeffrey 
Butler, also a patent practitioner. 
I was pleased to hear your comments, Chief Judge Michel, on 
the possible reconsideration of the Cybor issue.  My question goes 
to another aspect of claim construction, and that is the court’s view 
on where we are post-Phillips.106  A lot of clients, a lot of 
practitioners, as you know, Your Honor, had high hopes that 
Phillips would resolve a great many issues and questions.  I think a 
great many clients and practitioners probably don’t feel that all 
those issues were resolved and that we are left with a bit of an open 
 
106 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (restating 
the basic principles of claim construction and that the basic goal of claim construction is 
to determine the meaning of a claim term as understood by a person of ordinary skill in 
the art as of the effective filing date); accord Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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playing field when it comes to advising the clients and getting, 
prior to the trial judge, claim construction, much less before we get 
to your court. 
Is there some effort and focus on your court in streamlining the 
claim-construction process so it’s more explicable to clients and 
there is more foreseeability at the client level? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Again, very good questions, 
multiple questions. 
I think many of us feel that Phillips solved an aberrational 
problem of over-reliance on dictionaries,107 but it didn’t solve 
some of the other problems in claim construction.  So there is more 
work to do. 
I don’t want to speak on behalf of the court because it’s really 
not proper.  I don’t necessarily know what all of them think on any 
given issue. 
PROF. HANSEN: Do you care what they think? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Of course.  It takes two votes in 
every panel, and seven out of twelve in every en banc.  So you 
have to care what your colleague thinks. 
There is room for improvement.  It is needed.  I happen to 
favor the view of relying quite heavily on the written description 
portion of the patent document as the source of trying to 
understand the scope of the claims and the meaning of key words 
or phrases.108  The more you depart from that, the more 
indeterminate you make it.  The later testimony that comes up in 
trial isn’t available to you now when you are advising a client 
about whether he infringes a certain claim or not.  So I would like 
 
107 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310–24 (repudiating the dictionary-first approach to claim 
construction).  For the leading case in this repudiated line of jurisprudence, see Texas 
Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
108 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted 
claim, the court should look first to the patent itself, including the claims, the 
specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.  Such intrinsic evidence is the 
most significant source of the legally operative meaning.” (citation omitted)). 
C02_MICHEL_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  12:28 PM 
2010] SHOULD CONGRESS FIX THE PATENT OFFICE? 1167 
 
to see more reliance on the patent document itself and less reliance 
on more remote and extraneous kinds of sources.109 
I think it’s a fair criticism.  And even if we change the Cybor 
rule of totally de novo review,110 that doesn’t solve all of the 
problems.  There is a methodology problem.  We have heavy 
responsibility, as the patent court, the “Patent Supreme Court,” as 
we’re sometimes called, to work on that.  It probably has to be 
done en banc, as Phillips was.  Going en banc is a big challenge.  
There are several colleagues who are reluctant, as a matter of 
principle, in all cases to rehear en banc. 
We have one vacancy now, so the denominator has changed 
from twelve to eleven.  Therefore, the numerator required has 
changed from seven to six.  So I need five other judges to agree 
with me to take a case en banc and resolve a conflict or straighten 
out some problem, like the ones you raise.  I can often get three or 
four or five.  Getting the last vote or two is often extremely 
difficult.  But I’m doing better now than I was doing several years 
ago, so I’m hopeful. 
QUESTION: John Richards, practitioner and adjunct here. 
One of the effects which has come from Phillips in terms of 
drafting applications is that people are putting less now into their 
applications.  There is much less discussion of the prior art now 
than there used to be.  Object clauses are virtually gone, mainly 
because of what has been seen sometimes as being strange 
interpretations of these by the Federal Circuit.  Do you think that’s 
a good thing? 




109 See id. at 1583 (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will 
resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.  In such circumstances, it is improper to 
rely on extrinsic evidence. . . .  The claims, specification, and file history, rather than 
extrinsic evidence, constitute the public record of the patentee’s claim, a record on which 
the public is entitled to rely. . . .  Allowing the public record to be altered or changed by 
extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would make the right 
meaningless.” (citations omitted)). 
110 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
(“[C]laim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal.”).  
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CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: No.  It’s a terrible thing.  I think it’s 
based on a false reading of our case law.  People sometimes 
extrapolate wildly from what the case actually held or even what 
the court said, other than perhaps in blatant dicta. 
The people who say, “Don’t read your rival company’s patents 
because you’ll get hung for willful infringement”—I think that’s 
ridiculous.  People who say, “Don’t ever discuss what problem this 
invention is solving because it’s going to somehow come back and 
bite you”—I think that’s also a very exaggerated notion. 
Part of the problem with ambiguity in patent claims is that they 
are drafted deliberately to be ambiguous.  Let’s be honest.  Patent 
prosecutors are trying to get maximum scope, so they are always 
including some claims that are really well beyond what the 
inventor invented, I would say.  That’s okay.  The job of the 
examiner is to allow the claims that really were what the person 
invented and disallow the overbroad claims.  They don’t do that 
very well, and that goes back to the problem of resources and 
inexperience. 
But because the document is deliberately drafted to be 
ambiguous, we have to be a little bit forgiving when it’s not always 
predictable what the scope is.  It’s inherently difficult to have very 
simple or clear-cut rules and to be able to say in every case, “The 
scope of this patent is exactly three yards wide, and not one inch 
more or one inch less.”  We’re never going to get to that.  We can 
do better than we are now, but we’re never going to get to nirvana. 
QUESTION: John Pegram, practitioner. 
I would like to make a comment and then move to a question. 
The comment is that, with the median value of awards at 
around $3 million,111 and especially with the great increase in the 
discovery activity, there is a whole lot of wiggle room down there 
that your court never gets to see, and frequently the district judges 
 
111 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? 
An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006).  “There is general agreement that the costs associated with 
pursuing a patent lawsuit are high.  Previous authors have cited legal costs running . . . to 
$3 million per suit. . . .  These costs create incentives for parties to settle their dispute 
rather than seek a final judgment on the merits.” Id. at 243. 
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don’t get to see.  Nominally, there are around 2000 or more cases 
filed a year in the district courts, but for many, many years it has 
hovered around 100 trials a year.  There can be, therefore, bad 
behavior, frivolously brought lawsuits.  But the situation, with this 
great expense of litigation in our system, attracts people who are 
willing to litigate and then settle for less than the cost of litigation. 
So I think these problems do exist, but I think that you are 
perhaps sheltered from them in the Federal Circuit, because those 
cases—no one can afford to bring them far enough to get a 
resolution there.  They are settling for less than the cost of 
litigation. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: We are not sheltered from much of 
anything.  I have four different practitioner advisory groups, one 
on e-discovery, one on damages, one on other litigation tactics, and 
one on model jury instructions.  I get an earful all the time.  It’s 
very healthy, and I appreciate it.  But don’t feel that I’m highly 
sheltered.  I’m really not. 
I think there are problems of extortionate filings that lead to 
settlements because of the cost of litigation.  To me, the solution is, 
let’s fix the cost of litigation.  Civil litigation in America is 
unnecessarily slow and expensive.  It doesn’t have to be that way.  
It isn’t that way in England.  It’s not just patent cases.  The 
discovery rules apply in all civil cases, and they frequently create 
an extortionate type of situation, where somebody may feel, “On 
the merits, I should easily win this, but it will cost so much, it 
would be better to just pay these people half a million or whatever 
to go away.” 
That’s a terrible situation to have.  We ought to fix that.  We 
can fix that.  We can shift attorneys’ fees.  We can punish people 
for frivolous lawsuits.  We should do that.  That will help a lot. 
I agree that there are problems.  There are problems in every 
corner of the system.  There’s no part of it that’s perfect.  There’s 
no player in the system that I think is beyond criticism or 
improvement—not the courts, not Congress, not the PTO, and not 
the people who bring lawsuits.  You’re absolutely right.  I think we 
can do something about that.  And we should. 
PROF. HANSEN: You’re optimistic about changing it? 
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QUESTIONER: Would it take Congress to change some of 
these things? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: I think the discovery rules can be 
changed, if Congress will acquiesce.  It doesn’t have to engineer 
the change.  It just has to not veto it.  The Supreme Court also has 
a veto opportunity but almost never takes it.  So if the Judicial 
Conference, of which I’m a voting member, were to change the 
discovery rules, it’s likely that Congress and the Supreme Court 
would acquiesce, and better discovery rules would go into effect. 
I am optimistic.  Professor Hansen chided me a little bit.  Why 
am I optimistic?  I’m optimistic because vast portions of the 
corporate landscape are fed up with the civil litigation system and 
think it’s wildly too expensive and too slow and too disruptive and 
too unpredictable.  And they are the people that have influence, not 
only in Congress, but everywhere. 
So I really do think there is quite a good environment right now 
to make some important improvements in the practicalities of 
patent litigation, including on the point that you mentioned. 
QUESTIONER: The question that I would like to tempt you on 
is— 
PROF. HANSEN: How about you as a patent practitioner?  
Are you optimistic about change? 
QUESTIONER: I’m not highly optimistic.  I was involved in 
some attempts at rulemaking twenty-five years ago, and it really 
was only a small incremental bit of progress rather than achieving 
large goals. 
PROF. HANSEN: How many people are optimistic?  Let’s just 
get a show of hands. 
QUESTIONER: Optimistic about what, Hugh? 
PROF. HANSEN: That the discovery system we have in the 
United States, which is incredibly broad discovery, state and 
federal, which I think everyone says is just way too much, could be 
changed. 
How many people say, yes, it could be changed? 
How many people say no? 
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QUESTIONER: You have a huge institution, called lawyers, 
that has a private interest. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: It won’t be easy, but I think it’s 
possible, because there’s enough alarm, enough upset by enough 
different people that there is a potential for change now that didn’t 
exist five, ten, fifteen, twenty years ago.  We’ll see. 
PROF. HANSEN: I am sorry I asked you a question, but you 
did not get a chance to ask your question. 
QUESTIONER: I’m just holding onto the microphone in the 
hope that I might get a chance.  But it’s been a great dialogue here, 
and I have a microphone. 
PROF. HANSEN: OK, what’s your question? 
QUESTIONER: I would like to tempt Your Honor with the 
subject of juries, just calling attention to three or four points where 
I see some trend to say certain things do not or may not require a 
jury.  Certainly in KSR there was something there about 
obviousness that people are pointing to and saying this is an issue 
of law.  Of course, it’s always been said. 
There is in the area of willfulness, I think, only a couple of 
your court’s precedents, which really were not thoroughly argued, 
that say that willfulness is a matter that—if somebody wants to 
take that to the jury, where willfulness is only raised in the context 
of whether there should be an award of increased damages or 
attorneys’ fees, which is placed in the hands of judges—that, of 
course, is in the legislation. 
There is a suggestion in some of the Supreme Court authority 
on the doctrine of equivalents, that that isn’t necessarily for the 
jury.  It simply wasn’t reached.112 
I would like your thoughts on the jury in patent litigation. 
 
112 See Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis, 520 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1997).  The Court did 
not decide whether the judge or the jury considers the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents because it was not necessary. See id. at 37–38.  Nonetheless, the Court stated 
that there is “ample support in our prior cases” for the Federal Circuit to hold that it was 
the jury’s responsibility. Id. at 38.  
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CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: We have the Seventh 
Amendment,113 and I don’t think there is any chance that that is 
going to be changed. 
Then the issue is, you are going to have lay juries, trained 
neither in law nor science and technology, making important 
decisions in patent cases.  So how do you manage that to get the 
best outcomes? 
The way you manage it is, the trial judge only sends to the jury 
things that have to go to the jury and are justified to go to the jury.  
If the evidence is clear-cut that a patent is invalid, that it’s obvious, 
the judge should grant summary judgment in that case.  Therefore, 
that issue will never go to the jury. 
The same with willfulness.  Willfulness, if the predicate is 
there, is a jury issue as opposed to a judge issue because of the 
Seventh Amendment.  But very often the predicate isn’t there.  
Under Seagate, there has to be objective recklessness.114  If the 
evidence isn’t there to support objective recklessness, that’s an 
issue that never would need to go to the jury.115 
So I think by more assertive management of what issues are 
sent to the jury and what issues are resolved by the judge on a 
motions basis, we can make some very great improvements 
without changing the Seventh Amendment or our basic system. 
QUESTIONER: My observation is that judges prefer not to 
decide those issues. 
PROF. HANSEN: Why? 
QUESTIONER: Because life’s easier when you send 
everything to the jury, because you have to deal with a lot of 
motions, a practice which is very time-consuming.  I’m 
sympathetic to their position. 
 
113 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.”).  
114 See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
115 See id.  
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CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Of course, this goes back to the fact 
that we have 100 judicial vacancies that are not being filled by 
Congress and the White House, 100 new judgeships that have been 
desperately needed for years and years and years.  You know when 
the last appellate judge was added in the United States of America?  
1990.  Almost two decades with no additional appellate judge.  
Meanwhile, the workload has gone up 50% in numbers and about 
200% in difficulty.116 
PROF. HANSEN: What’s the backlog in your court?  How 
long does it take to get an appeal through your court? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: The median time in a patent case is 
11.5 months.  So essentially it takes us a year, on average, from 
filing to decision—already too long, although it’s much faster than 
most circuits. 
PROF. HANSEN: That’s pretty good, actually. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: It compares well with other circuits, 
but I think most circuits are too slow.  I think even we are slower 
than we ought to be. 
But judicial resources are part of the answer, a push from 
appellate courts to make trial judges do things, even if it’s more 
work, but it’s fairer to the parties, because it really shouldn’t go to 
the jury. 
PROF. HANSEN: Do you have more cases than other appellate 
courts?  It seems like you do.  You have all those personnel 
matters, for instance.  Per judge, do you have more cases than 
others? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: No.  We actually have many fewer 
cases than nearly all of the other circuits.  The First Circuit in 
Boston and the D.C. Circuit in Washington have similarly light-
looking caseloads, just “bean counting,” counting the number of 
filings per year and dividing it by the number of judges. 
If you count difficulty, then we have a much heavier caseload.  
But, of course, people dispute how to measure or rate difficulty. 
 
116 See Pamela A. MacLean, A Tricky Bid for More Federal Judges, NAT’L L.J., July 2, 
2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202422690814 (“Since 1990, 
case filings in federal appellate courts have increased 55 percent.”).  
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I think, actually, we have an adequate number of judges for the 
moment, given our caseload, because we recently got a fourth law 
clerk—and I had a long battle with Congress to get this—for each 
of our judges.  Every other appellate judge in the federal system 
has had a fourth law clerk for over a decade, but we only had three.  
They finally gave us a fourth law clerk.  That increases our output 
significantly.  And we now have vastly better computer 
resources—speed, memory, research capability, research 
resources, and so on.  That has sort of given added judicial 
capacity to the court. 
Given those two things and the mediation program that siphons 
off thirty or forty patent cases a year, we’re okay at twelve active 
judges. 
PROF. HANSEN: The Supreme Court is not busy.  They have 
ninety opinions a year or something like that.  You could maybe 
shuttle some of yours over to them.  Start with the easy ones. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Some people think it already has 
too many patent cases. 
We have about 1500 appeals filed a year.  As Professor Hansen 
alluded to, about a third of them are patent cases, but the other 
two-thirds are a huge variety of things utterly different from patent 
cases, including contract cases, tax cases, veteran benefit cases, 
cases involving childhood vaccine injuries, cases involving civil 
servants who have been fired, and on and on and on.  So we have a 
very diverse caseload.  About a third of it is in the IP area, most of 
that being patents. 
We have a very tough patent caseload, but some of our other 
cases sort of counterbalance that. 
PROF. HANSEN: Are they easier or harder? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: The personnel cases and the 
veterans cases usually are much easier—not always, but usually. 
PROF. HANSEN: In terms of fun, do you have more fun with 
the patent cases?  I would think so. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Not necessarily, no.  I love the 
patent cases.  It was alluded to earlier: How did I get on this patent 
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court when I didn’t know anything about patents?  I really didn’t 
know anything much about patents— 
PROF. HANSEN: Who said that? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: The dean or you. 
PROF. HANSEN: No, nobody said that.  But how did you get 
on the patent court? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: The answer is worth a moment.  I 
learned patent law because of men and women like you here in this 
room.  I’m a good student.  I read briefs for a living.  I can read 
appellate opinions, Supreme Court opinions, precedents of my 
court.  I learned a lot of patent law really fast, and I learned a lot of 
science and technology really fast the same way, and so did the 
other two-thirds of our court who are not patent lawyers.  We have 
about the same proportion of patent lawyers on the court as we 
have patent cases, which roughly makes some sense, I guess.  All 
the rest of us had to learn on the job. 
It’s not nearly as hard as you would think.  You don’t really 
have to become a technical expert.  You just have to learn bits and 
pieces of the technologies that drive the issues in the case.  The 
lawyers are very good at teaching that to us.  They have already 
taught it to the trial judges and juries in many cases.  If we’re good 
students, we can learn the technology we need to learn, and we can 
become quite expert over time in all the nuances of patent law, 
even if the day before we got appointed to the court, we didn’t 
know a patent from anything. 
PROF. HANSEN: Let’s go back to fun.  What do you have fun 
with? 
Some of the facts discussed tonight have been kind of 
depressing.  I’m trying to go to the upbeat part of this. 
What is good about it?  It’s an intellectual challenge, isn’t it, 
the patent cases? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: The patent cases are lots of fun, and 
when you can straighten out a problem in patent law, whether it’s a 
practical problem or a doctrinal problem, there is huge satisfaction 
in that, because you know that good consequences will come out of 
that—that there will be more scientific advance, that there will be 
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benefits to health and prosperity and to good order in the country.  
That’s hugely exciting. 
I have never had a boring day on the court.  I love being on the 
court. 
PROF. HANSEN: How do you determine who is on which 
panel? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: It’s done at random.  It used to be 
done by the chief judge.  We decided that that had too much 
potential for abuse.  The same transition has been made by nearly 
all of the other appellate courts.  They are nearly always now done 
at random. 
So if the panel changes every day of an argument week and the 
computer assembles the three—we have three panels sit at the 
same time.  We put together three batches of cases, so they aren’t 
all patent cases, but a mix of patent cases, contract cases, and so 
on.  Then the computer randomly assigns one of those three 
batches to one of the three panels.  So we can’t rig anything.  We 
have made that a foolproof system. 
QUESTION: Chief Judge Michel, when you have a case that 
is, let’s say, an en banc hearing or rehearing and you have a large 
number of amicus briefs being filed—in a case where a 
preponderance of amici are on one side as opposed to the other, 
does that have an effect on your decision making? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Zero.  It’s not vote counting.  If a 
brief is persuasive and informative and teaches us something 
important that the other party’s briefs didn’t, that has power.  If 
that brief writer is the only one on a certain side and there are 
twenty-five people on the other side, it doesn’t make any 
difference.  It’s the power of the one brief that makes the 
difference.  We don’t total them up and say, “Well, there are 
twenty-five briefs on this side and only six on this side.  The side 
with twenty-five must be right.”  We just don’t do that at all. 
So the numbers don’t count.  The persuasive power can count a 
lot, particularly where it adds to what the parties have already 
argued. 
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PROF. HANSEN: In Bilski, how many amicus briefs did you 
have? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Thirty-six.117 
PROF. HANSEN: And how many did you read? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Thirty-six. 
PROF. HANSEN: So every judge, every clerk working on the 
case read all thirty-six amicus briefs? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Sure.  You know, there are a lot of 
shortcuts.  You learn how to survive. 
My wife is an economist.  She calculated that, on average, in 
terms of paid work time, a judge of our court per case, for 
everything that has to be done in a case—read the briefs, read the 
record, write the opinion, critique the opinion, read the en banc  
petition, et cetera, et cetera, everything—eight hours, on average. 
We have to read briefs at mach speed, so we have learned lots 
of shortcuts.  We can easily see, “Oh, this was already covered in 
the other brief.  I don’t need to read this section.”  So, yes, you can 
get through thirty-six briefs because there are lots of shortcuts and 
there is lots of repetition. 
But it’s a heavy load. 
PROF. HANSEN: Do you have any guide to an effective 
amicus brief that you would like to share with us? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Sure.  What we really need to know 
more than anything else, and are seldom told, is, what has been the 
practical downstream effect of the rule that is being revisited in 
this appeal?  We know all the doctrine.  We have read the cases.  
We wrote the cases.  So lawyers who just give back to us the 
words of our prior cases aren’t really telling us anything new and 
different.  But lawyers who can tell us something about the 
practical effects in the world can have huge influence, particularly 
where the effects have been not so good.  That’s a strong impetus 
to change the rule, to clarify the doctrine, to do something 
different. 
 
117 See Hon. Paul R. Michel, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 705 (2009). 
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So that’s the kind of amicus brief I most like to see. 
The second kind is if the amicus brief finds some analogous 
area of law, not argued by the parties, but a pretty good analogue 
that would make us think a little harder and maybe be open to 
some new ideas, that can also be very constructive and creative. 
PROF. HANSEN: What about academic amicus briefs? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Hard to generalize.  Some are very 
helpful and some are not very helpful.  Some are very persuasive, 
some are not. 
I think it benefits the court to hear from a diversity of 
viewpoints.  I think to get a mix of briefs from industry people, 
litigators, academics, and others is a big plus.  The more diverse 
the mix, the better. 
QUESTION: I believe last year—I think it was a lecture or a 
speech; I don’t remember—you encouraged lawyers to petition for 
en banc review.118  You said that a lot of high-profile cases would 
be adjudicated better if they were being heard en banc.119  And you 
just said that things are better, but I wonder if you have any 
statistics.  Have you had more en banc petitions?  Have you started 
hearing more cases en banc? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: Let me correct the record here.  I 
wasn’t saying we need to have more petitions for en banc per year.  
We get about 150 a year.  About half of them are patent cases.  
That’s an ample number and it’s a heavy workload.  We really 
don’t need or desire to have more.  The quantity isn’t the thing. 
What I was trying to say is that if the petitions seeking en banc 
rehearing had higher quality, it would be a great help to the court.  
They often look like they were just done in a huge hurry, very 
superficial, mostly quoting back to us our own case law, and 
therefore not so helpful. 
With regard to amicus briefs, our biggest need is not for more 
amici—thirty-six in Bilski and large numbers in any en banc case.  
 
118 Eileen McDermott, Make Better Use of Federal Circuit, Says Chief Judge, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.managingip.com/Article/ 
2017893/Make-better-use-of-Federal-Circuit-says-Chief-Judge.html. 
119 See id. 
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Our biggest need for amicus briefs is not after the case has been 
taken for en banc rehearing, but on the threshold issue of whether 
we should take the case for rehearing.  We often have close votes, 
as I mentioned before.  If we had some good amicus input, maybe 
some of the cases that now fall short in the rehearing vote would 
get adequate votes and would be reheard, and there would be more 
clarification and correction of the law resulting from it. 
So I’m a big proponent of amicus briefs, especially ones that 
are high-quality.  But I would particularly like to see them on the 
threshold issue as opposed to just the thirty-seventh or thirty-eighth 
en banc rehearing. 
PROF. HANSEN: Is that something that you correct by  
sending out a notice that you are considering en banc and you 
welcome any amicus briefs, or you could also ask the Solicitor 
General to participate on behalf of the government.  Isn’t this  
within your power? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: We could solicit briefs.  But the 
knowledgeable practitioners who follow the work of the court can 
see when an opinion comes out if it’s a landmark kind of case and 
it’s going to be a strong candidate for en banc.  It seems to me 
those cases kind of identify themselves.  The amicus committees of 
the six or seven key patent-related bar associations are monitoring 
these things. 
I think they don’t understand the need for the brief on the 
question of whether to go en banc.  They are all assuming that the 
need for the brief is only after the case has gone en banc. 
PROF. HANSEN: If you would put out an announcement that 
you would appreciate briefs on whether to have an en banc 
hearing, you might get some briefs. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: I have been doing it in speeches, as 
the gentleman suggests.  Maybe some consideration should be 
given to more formal methods. 
MR. PEGRAM: Hugh, could I comment?  As a past member of 
one of those amicus committees, the timeframe for commenting 
when there’s a decision being made whether or not to go en banc is 
very short.  The bar associations and those groups really don’t have 
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time to, first, get the suggestion, then work up a recommendation 
to the association, obtain the approval which is usually required 
from a board of directors, and get a brief written.  The timeframe is 
usually very close. 
So the suggestion that was made—that if the court really wants 
amicus briefs on deciding this, if there is a way to say, “We’re 
seriously considering this, and we would like to hear from you”—
that is helpful if you want it at that stage. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: John, I met with the chairs of all the 
amicus committees of every organization I could identify, and they 
made a similar point.  As a result of that, we changed our rules and 
we doubled the amount of time available to both parties and amici 
on this threshold issue of whether a case should be reheard en 
banc.120  We encouraged them, where that time still wasn’t 
sufficient, to seek by motion still further time.  I suggested that the 
court would have a self-interest in being lenient on granting those 
motions. 
So we have worked on the problem of speed.  I understand it’s 
a problem for organizations.  We are doing everything we can to 
accommodate that.  On their part, the organizations have all 
undertaken internal reforms to speed up the internal clearance 
process.  So I think on both sides of the equation, substantial 
progress has been made.  And it should help a lot. 
PROF. HANSEN: Forget the organizations now.  What about 
just the bar?  Why aren’t you people [in the audience] submitting 
amicus briefs, especially firms that have a lot to do with 
prosecution?  If that’s an issue, that might be something that you 
might want to send something in on. 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: What about academics?  Why don’t 
academics file briefs? 
PROF. HANSEN: Academics have thoughts and ideas which 
can be interesting and provocative, but in terms of the real world, 
they are at a disadvantage. 
 
120 See Fed. Cir. Loc. R. 35.  
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CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: But an academic might be the 
perfect one to see an analogous area of law not previously brought 
to bear on a problem in patent law and to describe and analyze that 
analogue and draw the comparison. 
PROF. HANSEN: I think that’s true and that would be a good 
brief, but you rarely see that in academic briefs. It is not normally 
what you get.  You get very ideological briefs.  I’m not sure how 
helpful that is. 
John Richards [in the audience], what have you been doing if 
you are not filing amicus briefs? 
CHIEF JUDGE MICHEL: He has real clients. 
MR. RICHARDS: Why do we not do it?  It diverts resources 
from what we are actually doing.  We probably don’t spot the 
cases particularly early on.  I think that’s probably the main reason.  
There are times when I think, “Gee, I wish I’d written them 
something on that,” but the time is gone by the time I get around to 
really sitting down and thinking about it.  You need the odd 
weekend when you’re not doing something else to sort of get to 
grips with some of these issues. 
PROF. HANSEN:  Well, this has been wonderful.  Thank you 
all for your participation.  Paul, this was fantastic.  Thank you so 
much for tonight and this whole week at Fordham. 
[Applause] 
We’re going to have a reception outside.  I hope we can all go 
out there and continue this discussion. 
 
